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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WASATCH FRONT REGIONAL COUNCIL,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs.

Case No.

16340

SCOTT M. MATHESON, Governor of
the State of Utah, ROBERT B.
HANSEN, Attorney General of
the State of Utah, and JOHN
RAY McEVILLY,
Defendants and
Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a declaratory judgment action seeking construetion of the provisions of Sections 39-1-35 and 39-3-2, Utah
Code Ann.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Motions for summary judgment were filed by all parties
and were argued before the Honorable G.
ber 15, 1978.

Hal Taylor on Decem-

The court entered its Order on February 2,

1979, granting Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and
denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Order entered below
on February 2, 1979.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Wasatch Front is a regional council of the governments
in the metropolitan area along the geographical Wasatch
Front area.

Its purpose is to provide a forum for study and

discussion of regional problems of mutual interest to the
County Councils of Government within the region,

and to

prepare comprehensive plans for the growth and development
of the region.

(R.

p. 22).

Wasatch Front is a voluntary association having the
separate legal status necessary to carry out its functions.

It was created pursuant to the Utah Interlocal Co-operation
Act,§§ 11-13-1 et seq., Utah Code Ann.

(R.

p.23).

Membership of Wasatch Front is currently comprised of
the Salt Lake County Council of Governments, Davis County
Community Correlation Council, Weber Area Council of Governments, Tooele County Council of Governments, and the Morgan
County Coucil of Governments.

( R.

p. 23).

Wasatch Front currently employs 24 individuals.
its employees, defendant John Ray McEvilly,
of the Utah Air National Guard (Guard).

One of

is also a member

Two other Wasatch

Front employees, Michale Coulam and Douglas Hatterly, are
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members of the organized Reserves of the United States military forces

(Reserves).

(R. p. 24).

It has been, and continues to be, the policy of wasatch
Front to allow its employees, who are also members of the
Reserves or Guard, leaves of absence from their jobs for
their required annual training with the Reserves or Guard.
(R. p. 24).
Prior to March 23, 1978, Wasatch Front paid such Reserve and Guard personnel the full pay they would have
received for such annual training periods had they been
performing their duties for Wasatch Front in addition to the
pay they received from the Guard or Reserves.

(R. p.24).

On March 23, 1978, Wasatch Front adopted a resolution
changing its military leave pay policy for all of its
employees.

This new policy provides that Wasatch Front will

supplement the employee's military pay to the level of his
full Wasatch Front pay, by paying the difference between
what the employee would have earned had he been performing
his duties for wasatch Front, rather than in military service for the Reserves or Guard,

and the pay received by the

employee from the Reserves or Guard.

(R. pp. 24-25).

At the time Kasatch Front adopted this new policy,
several other agencies, organizations and governmental
subdivisions had similar policies of supplementing pay of
Individuals on military leave.

The new policy was adopted
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in the good faith belief that Wasatch Front was not an organization subject to the provisions of §§ 39-1-35 or 39-3-2,
Utah Code Ann., or if subject thereto, that the policy thus
adopted was in accordance with the provisions of said statutes.

(R. p. 25).

Defendant McEvilly brought suit in U.S. District Court,
District of Utah, against Wasatch Front and its individual
members, claiming that Wasatch Front's policy regarding military leave pay violated the provisions of §§ 39-1-35 and
39-3-2, Utah Code Ann., and thereby violated his civil rights
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, and his veteran's reemployment rights under 38 U.S.C. § 2024(d).

He claims that the

Utah statutes entitle him to his full pay as an employee of
Wasatch Front for the period of time in which he participated
in Guard training in addition to his Guard pay.
The instant declaratory judgment action was commenced
by Wasatch Front to resolve these disputed state law issues,
which have not been addressed in any reported cases of this
state.

United States District Judge A. Sherman Christensen

ordered that the federal court retain jurisdiction over the
federal case but abstain from proceeding further pending a
final determination in state court of these issues of state
law.
Motions for summary judgment in the instant case were
filed by all parties, and were argued before the Honorable
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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G. Hal Taylor on December 15, 1978.
reporter present.

There was no court

Judge Taylor granted defendants' motions

and denied plaintiff's.
Counsel for defendant McEvilly prepared and submitted
a proposed Order for approval by the parties.

As counsel

for plaintiff could not approve said proposed Order, they
filed their objections.

(R. pp. 70-72).

On February 2, 1979,

Judge Taylor signed and entered the order prepared by counsel
for defendant McEvilly, and on March 1, 1979, plaintiff filed
a Notice of Appeal.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
SECTIONS 39-1-35 and 39-3-2 EACH APPLY TO
DIFFERENT CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMPLOYEES, AND
TO MEMBERS OF DIFFERENT MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS.
Section 39-1-35 was originally enacted in 1917.

Its

material language has not changed since that time, and presently provides:
All state employees who are or shall become
members of the national guard of this state
shall be allowed full pay for all time spent
on duty at annual encampments or rifle competitions or other duties in connection with
the national guard not in service and such
time shall not be deducted from any vacations
such employees may be entitled to . . . .
This section clearly applies to state employees who are
members of the national guard.
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In 1941, with the impetus of World War II, § 39-3-1,

Utah Code Ann., was adopted.

It also has not changed in its

material parts since its enactment, and presently provides:
Every officer and employee of the state or of
any county, municipal corporation, or governmental district who enlists or is called or
inducted into and enters active service in the
state militia or any branch of the federal
military, naval, or marine service shall be
entitled to absent himself from his duties or
service while engaged in the performance of
active military or naval duty and while going
to and returning from such duty.
No such
officer or employee shall be subjected by any
person directly or indirectly by reason of
such absence to any loss or diminution of vacation or holiday privilege or be prejudiced
by reason of such absence with reference to
promotion or continuances in office, employment, reappointment to office, or re-employment.
This section is applicable to a broader range of employees than § 39-1-35, as it covers both employees of the
state and also those of any county, municipal corporation,
or governmental district.

Further, the coverage extends

beyond service in the state militia to also include service
in any branch of the federal military, naval or marine
service.

It was intended to ensure that the enumerated

public employees would not suffer any diminution of benefits
upon their return from active duty.
The title of this 1941 act clearly denotes the scope of
both the public employees covered and the military organizations included in this section:
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GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEES IN MILITARY SERVICE
An Act relating to State Officers and Employees
in Military Service and to Provide That All
Officers and Employees of the State or Any Municipal Corporation or Political Subdivision of
the State Who Are Members of the National Guard,
Naval Mllitia, Members of the Reserve Corps of
the United States Army or Forces in the Federal
Military, Naval, or Marine Service May Be Absent
From Their Places of Employment.
Chapter 105,
Laws of Utah 1941 (emphasis added).
Thus the distinction is made between employees of the
state, of a municipal corporation, and of a political subdivision of the state.

The distinction is also made between

members of the National Guard and members of the Reserve
Corps.
In 1955 the legislature enacted§ 39-3-2, Utah Code Ann.,
which has not been altered since its enactment, and which
provides:
All state employees and all employees of any
county and municipality thereof who are or
shall become members of the organized reserve
of the United States army, navy, air force
and marines, shall be allowed full pay for
all time not in excess of fifteen days per
year spent on duty at annual encampment or
rifle competition or other duties in connection with the reserve training and instruction requirements of the army, navy, air
force and marines of the United States.
This leave shall be in addition to annual
vacation leave with pay.
Thus the legislature again changed the scope of individuals covered in this statue from the 1917 and 1941 acts.
The 1955 act covers both state employees and employees of
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counties and municipalities, but does not include the ernployees of governmental districts and political subdivisions
which were included in the 1941 statue.

Further, the 1955

act does not cover members of the National Guard, as did
both the 1917 and 1941 statutes.
POINT II
SECTION 39-1-35 APPLIES ONLY TO MEMBERS OF
THE GOARD, AND SECTION 39-3-2 APPLIES ONLY
TO MEMBERS OF THE RESERVE
Defendants contend that members of the Guard are covered
by both the 1917 statute (§ 39-1-35) and the 1955 statute
(§ 39-3-2).

As discussed above,

the language of§ 39-1-35

does expressly cover members of the National Guard.

However,

defendants claim that the National Guard is one branch of the
"organized reserve of the United States army, navy, air force
and marines," and therefore is included under that provision
of §39-3-2.

They base their claim upon a federal definition

contained in 10 U.S.C. § 261(a):
The reserve components of the armed forces are:
(1)
The Army National Guard of the United States.
(2)
The Army Reserve.
(3)
The Naval Reserve.
(4)
The Marine Corps Reserve.
(5)
The Air National Guard of the United States.
(6)
The Air Force Reserve
(7)
The Coast Guard Reserve.
Nevertheless, §39-3-2 uses the terms "organized _£_~serve cf
the United States army, navy, air force and marines"
added).

(emphas1s

Those organizations are specifically listed as items ·1
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(3),

(4) and (6) above, and it is doubtful that the Utah

Legislature intended to include the three unnamed organizations by naming four others.
Even though the federal definition of reserve components
does include the Guard, the state is in no way bound by such
a definition, and it is not precluded from utilizing different
definitions or terminology.
Further, defendants'
conclusion.

interpretation leads to an untenable

If, as defendants contend, § 39-3-2 applies to

state employees who are members of the Guard, then it is
totally duplicative of parallel provisions in § 39-1-35, and
there is therefore no meaning left in much of § 39-1-35.

Rules

of statutory construction suggest just the oposite result:
that the statutes be read together giving meaning to the
provisions of both.
This rule of construction was stated by the court in
In re Utah Savings and Loan Ass'n., 21 Utah 2d 169, 442 P.2d
929

(1968):
If the latter statute could be looked at
separately as the whole law on the subject,
the contestants' position might have merit.
But that is not the way statutes are to be
interpreted and applied.
It is true here,
as it is in so many areas of the law, that
one statute has been enacted at one time with
a particular purpose in mind, and that another has been enacted at another time with
a different purpose in mind.
When this has
been done and there is an apparent conflict,
it is not proper to put all the emphasis to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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one statute, as though it stated all of the
law on the subject to the exclusion of the
other. They should be looked at together,
in theic relationship to each other, with a
view to reconciling any such appacent conflict and giving each its intended effect
insofar as that can be accomplished without
nullifying the other.
442 P.2d at 931-32
(emphasis added).
The historical discussion earlier indicates that the
terms "National Guard" and "Reserves" wece used by the
legislature to connote different organizations, and that
legislative intent should prevail over the federal definition.

By following this approach, each statute retains

meaning with no duplication, and each can be given its
intended effect.
Thus, §39-1-35 is only applicable to members of the
Guard, and § 39-3-2 is only applicable to members of the
Reserve.

As defendant McEvilly is a member of the Guard,

§39-3-2 is inapplicable to him.
POINT III
NEITHER § 39-1-35 OR § 39-3-2 IS APPLICABLE TO EMPLOYEES OF WASATCH FRONT
As discussed above, § 39-1-35, which applies to members
of the Guard, affords military leave pay only to state
employees.

Section 39-3-2, which applies to members of the

Reserves, affords military leave pay to state employees
employees of any county and municipality thereof.

and

Section

39-3-1 is broader still, giving leave of absence and protec-
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tion against any diminution of benefits to both the Guard
and reserves when called to active duty, and it applies to
employees of the state, any municipal corporation, political
subdivision or governmental district.
Defendants contend that Wasatch Front's employees are
state employees for purposes of §§ 39-1-35 and 39-3-2. They
base this claim upon the Utah Interlocal Co-operation Act,
§§

11-13-1 et seq., Utah Code Ann., which provides that a

separate legal entitiy formed pursuant to said act "is
deemed a political subdivision of the state." § 11-13-5.5,
Utah Code Ann.
They then claim that employees of political subdivision of the state are state employees. This argument is
unsound under the terms of both the Interlocal Co-operation
Act and the three military benefit statutes discussed
earlier.
The definitional section of the Interlocal Co-operation
Act, § 11-13-3, provides:
Definitions. --The following terms wherever
used or referred to in this act,
shall have the
following meanings:
( 1)
"Public agency" shall mean any
political subdivision of this state, including but not limited to cities, towns,
counties, school districts and special
districts of various kinds; any agency of
the state government or of the United
States; and any political subdivision of
another state.

-11- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Thus, the term "public agency" includes political subdivisions such as cities, towns, counties, school districts,
and special districts of various kinds.

As already discussed,

under §11-13-5.5 Wasatch Front is deemed to be a political
subdivision.
However, under defendants' contention that an employee
of a political subdivision of the state is a state employee,
every city employee, county employee, school district employee, and special district employee would also be a state
employee.

Such a result is absurd, and would make those

separate terms meaningless as they are used in the military
benefit statutes.
The logical conclusion is again that the legislature
used different terms in the different miltary benefit
statutes intending to cover different groups of public
employees.
Accepting defendants' contention would also ignore the
specific use of the term "governmental district"

in the 1941

act (§39-3-1) and the specific use of the term "political subdivision of the state" in the title to that same statute, and
would nullify the separate meaning of those terms.

Obviously,

if the legislature had intended § 39-1-35 to cover more than
state employees, or for § 39-3-2 to cover more than state,
county, and municipal employees,

they could have used the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided
-12-by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

additional language found in§ 39-3-1.

That different terms

are specifically used in each statue precludes the defendants'
contention that "state employees" means "employees of a political subdivision of the state;" to hold otherwise would be to
ignore an obvious legislative intent.
As the employees of Wasatch Front are not state ernployees, nor employees of a county or municipality, they are
not included within the scope of §§ 39-1-35 or 39-3-2.
POINT IV
AT MOST ONLY § 39-3-2, AND NOT § 39-1-35,
IS APPLICABLE TO EMPLOYEES OF WASATCH FRONT
For purposes of the Governmental Immunity Act, §§ 63-30-1
et seq., the Interlocal Co-operation Act, § 11-13-24, provides
in part:
Officers and employees performing services for two
or more public agencies pursuant to contracts executed under the provisions of this act shall be
deemed to be officers and employees of the public
agency employing their services • • . .
In the instant case, the individual public agency members
of Wasatch Front are various "county councils of government."
Arguably,
ployees of

under the provisions of§ 11-13-24, cited above, em~asatch

Front are thereby deemed to be employees

of councils, at least for some purposes.
In the instant case, § 11-13-24 provides, at best, an awkward result.

Defendants' use of this appraoch in the instant

case requires a conclusion that "employees of county councils
of government" are equivalent to "county employees."

This is
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not the type of situation for which§ 11-13-24 was intended or
should be used.

It is a clearer and more satisfactory result

to apply§ 11-13-5.5, cited earlier, and thereby conclude that
Wasatch Front's employees are deemed employees of "a

politi~l

subdivision of the state."
However, even assuming that Wasatch Front's employees
are deemed county employees in the instant case, only § 39-3-2,
and not § 39-1-35, purports to cover county employees. And,

/

as discussed earlier, § 39-3-2 is not applicable to members

I

of the Guard, but only to members of the Reserve.

.

Therefore,

as defendant McEvilly is a Guard member, he cannot claim
coverage under§ 39-3-2 even if Wasatch Front's employees are
deemed county employees under the provisions of§ 11-13-24.
POINT V
WASATCH FRONT'S POLICY OF DIFFERENTIAL PAY IS
THE FULL PAY REQUIRED BY §§ 39-1-35 AND 39-3-2.
If Wasatch Front is subject to §§ 39-1-35 or 39-3-2, the
question remains as to what is meant by "full pay."

In de-

ciding such questions of statutory construction the court
must again look at the entire statute to determine the intent
of the legislature.

In Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 26

Utah 2d 100, 485 P.2d 1035 (1971), the court stated:
[T]here is also this principle to be considered:
that where there is ambiguity or uncertainty in
a portion of a statute, it is proper to look to
the entire act in order to discern its meaning
and intent; and if it is reasonably susceptible
of different interpretations, the one should be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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chosen which best harmonizes with its general
purpose.
485 P.2d at 1037 (emphasis added).
Section 43 of the State Militia Act, Ch. 99, Laws of
Utah 1917, enumerated specific dollar amounts for the pay
of state militia in the service of the state.

Section 43

included the following restriction:
Provided:
that this State shall make no payments
to members of the militia in the case of service
for which the United States government makes payment.
The annual encampment of the national guard
will be considered as in the service of the State.
Thus, duplicate federal-state payments were prohibited.
As the annual encampment was considered state service, there
was no federal payment involved.

Therefore, no violation of

the duplicate payment prohibition occurred when the state
paid salaries of men in the militia.
However,

in 1919 the statute was amended as follows:

Encampments of the National Guard shall be such as
provided for by the Secretary of war, under Section
94 of the Acts of Congress, approved June 3, 1916,
known as the National Defense Act. The cost and
maintenance, transportation, subsistence and expense
for such enc~mpment and maneuvers shall not be paid
by the State, but as provided for ~Section 94, Act
of Congress, approved June 3, 1916.
Ch. 75, Laws of
Utah 1919 (emphasis added).
Thus the expenses of annual encampment were no longer
paid by the state, but by the federal government.

As such,

the duplicate federal-state payment prohibition would bar
any state payment, such as that provided in § 39-1-35, where
the services were compensated by the federal government.
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The present statutes provide:
39-1-51.
Pay of national guard members. --When
called into the service of the state and not in the
service of the United States, the members of the
national guard shall receive the same pay and allowance as members of the regular army or regular air
force of like rank and length of service.
In addition to the above pay, officers and enlisted personnel
shall receive one ration per day; provided, that this
state shall make no payments to members of the national
guard in the case of service for which the United
States government makes payment.
(Emphasis added).
39-1-52.
Encampments.--Encampments of the national
guard shall be such as may be provided for by the
national guard bureau and under authority of Congress.
The cost of maintenance, transportion and subsistence,
and other expenses of such encampments and maneuvers,
shall not be paid by the state, but as provided for
by Congress.
(Emphasis added).
Thus, the additional pay claimed by defendants is prohibited by the statutory language that the state make "no
payment" to members of the Guard where the federal government
has compensated them for their services.

wasatch Front's

policy of supplementing Guard or Reserve pay to the level of
full civilian pay more closely complies with the legislative
intent of prohibiting a double payment,

as it only repre-

sents a supplement to the federal pay, and not a duplication
thereof.

In view of the rules of statutory construction pre-

scribed in Utah Savings, supra, and Grant, supra, Wasatch
Front's differential pay approach appears to be the best
solution to the otherwise ambiguous and conflicting statutes. ,
Further § 39-3-1 provides for protection against any
diminution of employment benefits for public employees called
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to active duty.
fits.

There is no provision for additional bene-

This is also the intent of

§

39-1-35, which provides

that time spent at National Guard annual encampments "shall
not be deducted from" vacations, and of

§

39-3-2, which pro-

vides that leave for Reservists "shall be in addition to
annual vacation leave with pay."
In accordance with this intent to prevent diminution in
employment benefits, and with the direct prohibition of
duplicate federal-state payments found in
the term "full pay" as used in

§§

§§

39-1-51 and 52,

39-1-35 and 39-3-2 should

be constured as requiring at most that the employer supplement the employees' military pay to the level of his full
civilian pay.
CO~CLUSION

The employees of Wasatch Front Regional Council are not
state, county, or municipal employees within the meaning of
§§

39-1-35 or 39-3-2, Utah Code Ann., and therefore defendant

McEvilly has no claim for more military leave pay than he has
already received.
Defend3nt McEvilly, a Guard member, is at most only
covered by
~e~bers

§

39-1-35, and not by § 39-3-2 which deals with

of the Reserves.

However, Wasatch Front is at most

subject only to the provisions of

§

39-3-2, if its employees

be deemed county employees under§ 11-13-24 of the Interlocal

-17-
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Co-operation Act.

Again the conclusion is that defendant

McEvilly has no claim for more military leave pay than he has
already received.
Even if defendant McEvilly is entitled to "full pay"
under either or both §§ 39-1-35 of 39-3-2, Wasatch Front has
paid him all he is entitled to receive by reason of said statutes, as they have supplemented his Guard pay to the level
of his full Wasatch Front pay.
For the foregoing reasons, the lower court's Order of
February 2, 1979, granting defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment and denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment,
should be reversed.
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